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Abstract
Martha Nussbaum’s political theory of compassion offers an extensive and compelling study of the potential of employ-
ing compassionate emotions in the political realm to further social justice and societal “love”. In this article, two pitfalls
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and the “magic” of feeling compassion that potentially removes the subject of compassion from reality. I will argue that
Hannah Arendt’s thoughts on pity provide substantial challenges to a democratic theory of compassion in this respect.
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1. Introduction
To claim that political emotionality was prevalent dur-
ing the 45th presidential election in the United States
would certainly be an understatement. Donald Trump’s
powerful play with people’s anger, fear, and insecuri-
ties, coupled with his aggression (most notably directed
against immigrants and women and the female body),
his arousal of patriotism, and the successful emotional
creation of the illusion of belonging to a well-defined
community, has not only left a distinctive mark in the
history of US elections but is already eagerly discussed
in scholarly thought about emotions1 in politics (e.g.,
Fording & Schram, 2017; Tucker, 2018; Valentino,Wayne,
& Oceno, 2018).
However, Donald Trump was not the only candidate
who was pressing emotional buttons in order to enforce
his political vision during the election campaign. Trump’s
political adversary, the Democratic candidate Hillary Clin-
ton,was also trying to address, visualise, and arouse emo-
tions, although of a different nature: throughout her cam-
paign, Clintonwas relying on “love” and compassion. One
example that perfectly illustrates this strategic employ-
ment and fostering of compassionate emotions both as a
political means and a political end is the campaign video
ad titled “Love and Kindness”, released in April 20162,
1 When referring to “emotions” I am concernedwith phenomenawhich can be attributed to the subjective perception that one “is moved” by something,
a sensation that is usually directed towards a specific object. I use the term in a broad sense, thus leaving room for variations in terms of the cognitivist
and/or phenomenological content of these phenomena, but distinguishing them from pre-conscious affects (e.g., Leys, 2011, p. 443). The phenomena
I am concerned with can occur in the public realm (this aspect is crucial in that Arendt draws a clear distinction between private “passions” and public
“emotions”, as we shall see later). By using the term “emotions” in this way, I am able to accommodate both Martha Nussbaum’s (explicit, consistent,
and extensively defined) and Hannah Arendt’s (more vaguely defined) terminology in the comparison of the two theories.
2 https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/hillary-clinton-love-and-kindness–campaign-2016/2016/04/26/dc360c68-0b62-11e6-bc53-db634ca
94a2a_video.html?utm_term=.b0f942d45e59
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and a modified version under the same title that was
uploaded onto Clinton’s official YouTube channel several
days before election day3. These two 60-second video
clips show Clinton on the campaign trail, apparently at-
tempting to display her emotional involvement with citi-
zens and peers (women especially, but also children and
families), addressing her audiences with lots of pathos,
in the spirit of compassion. “I know it sometimes seems
a little odd for someone running for president to say: ‘We
needmore love and kindness in America’. But I am telling
you, from the bottom of my heart, we do”, Clinton is de-
picted declaring in the latter of the two ads. It is thus
apparent that Clinton and her team had explicitly des-
ignated compassionate emotions as both worth striving
for the future of the US-American society (political end)
and as one of the basic instruments for her campaign
and a potential presidency (political means). “From the
bottom of my heart”, furthermore, explicitly points us to
the fact that Clinton sought to convey emotional authen-
ticity and “warmth” in her political agenda. This is not
surprising, given the fact that Clinton has widely been
perceived as cold-hearted and “robot-like” (e.g., Cunha,
2016), thereby revealing the unsettling continuation of
powerful gender stereotyping for women in politics.
Clinton’s focus on compassionate emotions as both
political means and political end in her electoral cam-
paign reminds us, to some extent, of Martha Nussbaum’s
political theory of emotions (e.g., Nussbaum, 1996, 2001,
2013, 2016). Nussbaumpromotes compassion as a useful
and vital emotion to be employed in the political realm in
order to advance social justice and more collective striv-
ing towards an Aristotelian version of the “good life”, ar-
guing that compassion, and public “love”, help overcome
tendencies of societal exclusion and providing support
for the sacrifices which are needed for the common good.
In the following analysis, I will briefly outline Martha
Nussbaum’s political theory of compassion. I will then
continue to problematise certain aspects of her nor-
mative recommendation to further compassion as both
a political means and a political end with the help of
another political theory of compassion/pity, the one
Hannah Arendt proposed in On Revolution (1963/2016).
It will become clear that Nussbaum’s very affirming ac-
count of the potential of compassion in the political
realm and her vision of a “public culture of compassion”
(Nussbaum, 2013, p. 157) are in fact at risk at generat-
ing substantial threats for a democratic understanding
of politics—due to two specific pitfalls, namely the prob-
lem of a dual-level hierarchisation and the “magic” of
feeling compassion that potentially removes the subject
of compassion from reality. These underlying problems
in Nussbaum’s proposal might eventually undermine the
exact values this compelling project was originally de-
signed to promote.
After discussing these two challenges to Nussbaum’s
proposal of a compassionate “emotion-driven politics”
(Nussbaum, 2013, p. 396) I will turn to Hillary Clinton’s
presidential campaign which ran under the slogan
“Stronger Together”. I will argue that the two aforemen-
tioned campaign video clips are telling illustrations of the
pitfalls of a politics of compassion. Obviously, the dis-
cussion of Nussbaum’s and Arendt’s theories in this re-
spect does not explain Clinton’s electoral defeat. It is nei-
ther my aim to provide a detailed analysis of the Demo-
cratic presidential campaign, nor do I seek to offer an ex-
tensive study on the myriad of possible reasons why it
had failed at the ballot box. Instead, despite—or, rather,
because of—their being one-dimensional and pointed
due to their very purpose, Clinton’s campaign videos fit-
tingly illustrate my claim that a critical engagement with
Nussbaum’s theses with the help of Arendt’s is fruitful
and vital for further theoretical reflections on both the
potential and dangers of employing compassion/pity as
a political emotion.
2. The Potential of a “Public Culture of Compassion”
Election campaigns such as Hillary Clinton’s are certainly
not the only instances in which we can detect emotion
in political life. Reflections on the role of emotion and
affects in the political realm have increasingly been pub-
lished over the last two decades, for particular emo-
tions and with specific research foci (e.g., Ahmed, 2014;
Arrifin, Coicaud, & Popovski, 2016; Demertzis, 2013;
Engelken-Jorge, Güell, & Del Rio, 2011; Goodwin, Jasper,
& Polletta, 2001; Hoggett & Thompson, 2012; Marcus,
2000; Walzer, 2004; Westen, 2007; Wodak, 2015). How-
ever, although compassionate emotions had once been
prominent elements in influential political thought, for
example in the political theories of David Hume, Adam
Smith, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and although com-
passion/pity and empathy are now increasingly empha-
sised and valorised in neoliberal terms (Hochschild, 1983;
Illouz, 2007; Pedwell, 2014; Rifkin, 2009)—despite this,
(female connoted) compassionate emotions still seem to
have to prove their worth both for (male connoted) re-
alpolitik and current mainstream political science alike
(notable exceptions are, e.g., Berlant, 2004; Pedwell,
2014; Ure & Frost, 2014).
In light of this research gap, Martha Nussbaum’s ex-
tensive studies on the relationship between compassion-
ate emotions and politics (1996, 2001, 2003, 2013) have
attracted much scholarly attention. Nussbaum argues
that emotions, in general, are not only ever-present in
politics but that we should also think of strategies to ac-
tively employ certain kinds of emotions in order to cre-
ate a more just society. She writes: “All political princi-
ples, the good as well as the bad, need emotional sup-
port to ensure their stability over time, and all decent
societies need to guard against division and hierarchy by
cultivating appropriate sentiments of sympathy and love”
(Nussbaum, 2013, pp. 2–3).
Nussbaum singles out one of the most promising,
“positive and helpful” (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 135) emo-
3 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w-iuPeMdprQ
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tions for stabilising “decent” societies and political sys-
tems (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 3): compassion4. Nussbaum
defines compassion as “a painful emotion directed at
the serious suffering of another creature or creatures”
(Nussbaum, 2013, p. 142). However, compassion, for
Nussbaum, is not only a “private” emotion but verymuch
a “collective” one: compassion can serve as a “bridge be-
tween the individual and the community” (Nussbaum,
1996, p. 28). It is this bridge that needs to be erected first,
though, because Nussbaum acknowledges the fact that
compassion, by its very nature, can be partial (Nussbaum,
2013, p. 157). This means that I might only feel com-
passion towards those who are literally nearest and
those who, through familial or cultural ties, are dearest
to me. In her programmatic and normatively charged
study Political Emotions (2013), as a political end, she
thus calls for a widening of our own very narrow circle
of concern up to the national level, through education
(p. 124) and through a compassionate culture that pro-
motes shared encounters, especially in specifically de-
signed public places (p. 261). As a political means, she
demands that compassion be “practiced” in schools and
beyond, with the help of literature (Nussbaum, 2013,
pp. 276–279, 1995, p. 10) and role play (Nussbaum,
2013, p. 176). Furthermore, politicians and other polit-
ical agents should actively address and evoke compas-
sion for fellow citizens in matters of social justice. This
could be achieved with the help of imagery (Nussbaum,
2013, pp. 283–284), for example, or moving and compas-
sionate political speeches such as Lincoln’s Gettysburg
Address (Nussbaum, 2013, pp. 229–234).
Meanwhile, legislation and jurisdiction, according
to Nussbaum, have to be set up according to impar-
tial principles (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 20), the support of
which could also be furthered by her rather daring vi-
sion of a “public culture of compassion”. Indeed,much of
Nussbaum’s account reads almost like a political utopia,
which she claims to contain a very real potential for cur-
rent political practices (Nussbaum, 2013, pp. 383–385).
However, this alleged realistic nature of Nussbaum’s vari-
ous ideas for how to foster “positive” emotions in a given
society has been met with some scepticism. Veronika
Vasterling, for instance, has criticised Nussbaum’s focus
on civic education through literature as being too unreal-
istic and sterile for a world that is actually much less co-
herent than Nussbaum allegedly gives credit for, a world
which is based on the very “messy business” of interact-
ing with the other (Vasterling, 2007, p. 90).
It is thus necessary to critically examine Nussbaum’s
claims with regard to the limitations of the “public cul-
ture of compassion”. In the following analysis, I aim to
highlight two specific challenges to Nussbaum’s norma-
tive proposal. I will demonstrate that one of the best
ways of doing so is to employ Hannah Arendt’s po-
litical theory for this task (see also Degerman, 2016,
pp. 17–18). An extensive and systematic comparison
of the two theoretical explorations of (compassion-
ate) emotions in politics has not yet been undertaken,
even though some (rather) recent studies have pro-
vided brief and partial analyses of the two theories in
this respect (e.g., Degerman, 2016; Roberts-Miller, 2007;
Rosenmüller, 2015).
3. (Arendtian) Challenges to Compassion/Pity as a
Political Emotion
The fact that both theories have yet to be systemati-
cally subjected to comparison is probably due to the im-
pression that Arendt and Nussbaum offer very different
views on the role of emotions in politics in general, as
well as very different views regarding the “positive” and
dangerous political effects compassion/pity might have5.
Arendt has neither written about emotions extensively,
at least not as extensively as Nussbaum, nor is she of
the opinion that emotions should belong into the polit-
ical realm at all (e.g., Arendt, 1963/2016, p. 91), a cru-
cial point which she emphasises throughout her oeuvre.
Arendt’s theory is thus not the first choice to consult
whenever one wishes to engage in a political theory of
emotions, although some publications have sought to
illuminate the role of (particular) passions/emotions in
her political theory (e.g., Degerman, 2016; Heins, 2007;
Lang, 2015; Newcomb, 2007; Swift, 2011).
Much of that which manifests Arendt’s most well-
known stance on emotions in politics can be found in
her study on the French and the American Revolution.
Arendt’s deliberations inOn Revolution (1963/2016) con-
stitute a significant and comparatively extensive account
on what happens when (compassionate) emotions are
employed as a political means to a specific political end.
Even if her thoughts revolve around the context of revo-
lutions, it is clear from the content of other accounts in
which she touches the issue of passions and emotions,
notably The Life of the Mind (1978), Men in Dark Times
(1968), and Rahel Varnhagen (1957/1997), that her re-
marks on pity as a political emotion can be extended to
other, non-revolutionary political settings as well.
These deliberations serve as fruitful arguments
against some of Nussbaum’s very affirming claims of the
potential of evoking compassion in the political realm.
As a conceptual preliminary remark it must be said that
if one is to bring Nussbaum’s and Arendt’s political the-
ories of compassion/pity into any dialogue, it needs to
be clarified that Arendt makes a twofold distinction be-
tween the private “true” “passion” of compassion, which
marks a direct reaction to individual and concrete suf-
fering (Arendt, 1963/2016, p. 85), and the political “per-
version” (Arendt, 1963/2016, p. 84) of such passion into
4 Compassion, according to Nussbaum, is not the same as empathy, which she defines as the “ability to imagine the situation of the other, taking the
other’s perspective” (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 145), which is neither necessary nor sufficient for compassion (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 146).
5 It is worth noting that Nussbaum herself refrains from referring to Arendt’s theory throughout her work on political emotions, except from her brief
rebuttal of Arendt’s Reflections on Little Rock (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 316), and her engagement with Arendt’s analysis of Augustine’s concept of love
(Nussbaum, 2001, pp. 551–556).
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pity, thus turning into a public “sentiment”. This pity, be-
ing “sorry without being touched in the flesh” (Arendt,
1963/2016, p. 80), is able to “reach out to the multi-
tude” (Arendt, 1963/2016, p. 84), and it can deliber-
ately be evoked in the public realm in order to address
a collective. Arendtian pity as a public sentiment can
thus serve as the equivalent to Nussbaum’s political emo-
tion of compassion—despite the difference in terminolo-
gies and the widely diverging conceptual notions they at-
tribute to this collective phenomenon.
InOn Revolution, Arendt provides several reasons for
her vehement warnings against using pity as both a polit-
ical means and/or a political end—warnings that stress
the proto-totalitarian potential of pity as a public emo-
tion (Arendt, 1963/2016, p. 96). Due to the brevity of
this article, I can neither provide a detailed rendition of
the general characteristics she assignes to pity, nor of all
the reasons she gives for ascribing to pity not an apolit-
ical, but an anti-political character (see also Newcomb,
2007, p. 117) according to the Arendtian notion of that
which manifests “the political”. I would like to focus on
two major issues which Arendt has with pity which help
us challenge Nussbaum’s very affirming notion of a “pub-
lic culture of compassion”: the problem of hierachisation
and the “magic” of feeling compassion and its relation
to reality.
3.1. Dual-Level Hierarchisation
Let us first consider the issue of hierarchy, which brings
us to a striking paradox in Nussbaum’s theory: conceptu-
ally, Nussbaum explicitly tries to stay clear of any notion
of a hierarchy that might be prevalent in compassionate
emotions, and she insists that a given society will in fact
potentially become less hierarchical if it furthers compas-
sion as a political emotion. However, it is her proposal of
a “public culture of compassion” itself which threatens
to establish hierarchies—both between the subject and
the object of compassion as well as between those who
decide to pursue Nussbaum’s vision and those who op-
pose this project.
Nussbaum purposefully refrains from using the term
“pity” since, according to her, it has come to be regarded
as establishing a hierarchy and superiority between the
subject and the object of pity (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 301)6.
In her proposal of a “public culture of compassion”, Nuss-
baum seems to refute the negative aspects associated
with the emotion of compassion despite its inherent
shortcomings such as its inclination to partiality. We
might be tempted to disagree, since the first problem
in Nussbaum’s account that threatens to reinforce a hi-
erarchy lies with the connection between the emotion
itself and its propensity to direct action: In that we feel
pity, or are advised to feel it for others on a collective
level, according to Arendt, the danger arises that we feel
an (immediate) urge to help others, to rescue them, by
making politics for them, and not with them (Arendt,
1958/1998, p. 180).
This, I believe, is a crucial critique on compassion/pity
as a political emotion—one that cannot be discarded eas-
ily, at least not if we refrain from a paternalistic notion
of politics. Compassion/pity thus threatens to establish
a clear hierarchy between the subject and the object
of this emotion. Even though Nussbaum carefully tries
to avoid this hierarchy, nevertheless this danger seems
to underlie the notion of “a painful emotion directed at
the serious suffering of another creature or creatures”—
especially so because Nussbaum does not consider the
condition of “similar possibilities” as a necessary ele-
ment for compassion (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 144). Com-
passion/pity may thus further the societal divide, rather
than reduce it.
The second challenge regarding the relationship be-
tween Nussbaum’s proposal of a “public culture of com-
passion” and the pitfall of hierarchisation emerges on
the metalevel: while Nussbaum rejects Rousseau’s the-
ory of “civic love” for being “obedient” and “hierarchi-
cal” (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 45), she maintains that, in her
“project”, certain emotions such as compassion “con-
duce to equal respect and toleration” (Nussbaum, 2013,
p. 122, emphasis in original). Nussbaum insists that crit-
ical engagement and scrutiny with such a programmatic
vision are necessary and need to be promoted actively
(e.g., Nussbaum, 2013, pp. 389). Turning to John Stuart
Mill and Rabindranath Tagore, Nussbaum is of the opin-
ion that “a culture of sympathy and imagination is fully
compatible with, and indeed can reinforce, a liberal cul-
ture of experimentation and dissent” (Nussbaum, 2013,
p. 105). However, Nussbaum does not offer satisfying an-
swers as to how the opportunity for dissent and accord-
ing political action should be incorporated into this par-
ticular visionary political and social culture.
Hence, the problemwith Nussbaum’s proposal is that,
if put into practice, it at least urges people to, and in
worst cases might even be perceived as forcing people
to feel compassion/pity. It might thus be regarded as
inflicted ‘from above’ and thus fuel resentment of ‘the
establishment’ and its policies which is currently preva-
lent. Nussbaum’s credo “[i]nvite, not coerce” (Nussbaum,
2013, p. 388) tries to address this conceptual challenge
but does not convincingly abolish it. Since her normative
approach of actively fostering compassion encompasses
nearly all areas of that which Nussbaum subsumes un-
der her wide definition of the political realm (Nussbaum,
2013, pp. 16–17), in effect, it will touch people’s lives on
various levels. According to Degerman, in this case, con-
sequences such as “compulsory education or the stigma
of abnormality” would be conceivable (Degerman, 2016,
p. 17). Hence, it is this all-encompassing dimension of her
vision that is both attractive and normatively problematic.
The challenges to Nussbaum’s approach to foster a
political culture of compassion will become clearer if we
6 In fact, it might indeed have been Arendt’s political thought that had a role in maintaining this notion of the hierarchical relationship between the
subject and the object of pity. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this insight.
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again turn to Hannah Arendt’s critical remarks on em-
ploying pity in the political realm: for Arendt, politics is
necessarily amatter of dealingwith the pluralistic. To her,
pity, the “perversion” of the private passion of compas-
sion into a public emotion, leads to the fact that this plu-
rality of opinions and desires can become subduedby the
one pressing issue that demands us to act immediately
and in total unison (Arendt, 1963/2016, pp. 72–74). Dur-
ing the French Revolution, Arendt writes, this pressing
issue was the abolishment of misery that was enforced
in accordance with (her reading of) Rousseau’s the-
ory of the volonté générale, the “popular will” (Arendt,
1963/2016, pp. 70–74). Simon Swift has rightly pointed
out that, in Arendt’s interpretation, pity had thus served
as a “grotesque alibi” (Swift, 2011, p. 84) for the revolu-
tionaries’ biopolitical agenda.
While agreeing in their refusal of the “dictato-
rial” nature of Rousseau’s proposal of a “civil reli-
gion” (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 5), the political context of
Nussbaum’s and Arendt’s thoughts differ fundamentally.
Nonetheless, I think we can take a valuable point from
Arendt’s verdict which can legitimately be transferred
onto Nussbaum’s theory: A (compassionate) “emotion
programme” such as Nussbaum’s might potentially clash
with the pluralistic and diverse (political) interests of
each individual. Hence, to some, the political demand to
live in and actively shape a compassionate society can
indeed resemble a totalising notion of inflicting a single
political will in the shape of “rules of feeling” (Hochschild,
2016, p. 228) onto citizens who may not be provided
with the ability to dissent, or to have their dissent heard
and incorporated into political decision-making. Addi-
tionally, with Arendt, it could be argued that compas-
sion/pity as a political end might hinder or disable the
impetus for individual political judgment itself. Arendt’s
insistence on the plurality of political opinions and in-
terests, as well as on the possibility to judge indepen-
dently and act accordingly with others, thus clashes with
an “emotion programme” that is introduced as an over-
riding political means, and, in a way, a political end as
well (e.g., Nussbaum, 2013, p. 392). This clash seems to
be inscribed in Nussbaum’s vision in its totality.
In his analysis of Arendt’s stance on emotions in pol-
itics, Dan Degerman pushes a similar point about the
question of authenticity in Nussbaum’s theory even fur-
ther: “By reasserting Arendt’s distinctions between the
heart, the private, and the public in political discourse,
we can protect the depth of the individual from collective
colonization” (Degerman, 2016, p. 18). We might not go
this far and resort to Arendt’s overall protection of the
political realm from emotions (and thus, to a certain de-
gree, support her controversial differentiation between
the private, the political, and the social, e.g., Benhabib,
1996, p. 155; most articles collected in Honig, 1995; von
Tevenar, 2014, p. 38) in order to challenge Nussbaum’s
theory and its alleged gravitation towards “collective
colonization”. However, despite Nussbaum’s best inten-
tions to state the contrary, the underlying problem of an
“emotion programme” that enforces “feeling rules” and
that potentially neglects diverse political and cultural at-
titudes certainly protrudes from the conceptual surface
and demands to be addressed.
3.2. The “Magic” of Feeling Compassion/Pity
With Arendt, I would like to draw attention to a second
major obstacle against Nussbaum’s vision of a “public cul-
ture of compassion”: the problem of the (self-deceptive)
“magic” (Arendt, 1963/2016, p. 76) of feeling compas-
sion/pity.
In Upheavals of Thought Nussbaum states:
People can all-too-easily feel that they have done
something morally good because they have had an
experience of compassion—without having to take
any of the steps to change the world that might in-
volve them in real difficulty and sacrifice....This does
not mean that compassion by itself has bad tenden-
cies; it means that people are frequently too weak
to keep their attention fixed on a course of action
and that a momentary experience is frequently much
easier for them than a sustained commitment. This
gives us reason to insist on going beyond compassion
and to focus, as does Kant, on action and institutions.
(Nussbaum, 2001, p. 399)
Hence, Nussbaum herself mentions a problematic side-
effect of compassion—the exaltation of moral goodness
that, paradoxically, might even prevent concrete action
to alleviate the sufferer’s pain: “When I feel compas-
sion for a person who is suffering, I often imagine help-
ing that person, and in many cases I do it” (Nussbaum,
2016, p. 22, emphasis added). This imagination can, in
some cases, evolve into a powerful and lavish deception,
a deception that defies reality and thus action that is
designed to address this reality. Nussbaum’s answer to
this problem in Political Emotions is, on the one hand,
to (rather vaguely) address and affirm the robustness
of political institutions that serve as the necessary back-
bone of liberal politics. On the other hand, Nussbaum
also strongly appeals to the emotional experience of a
collective in order to actively further the political aim of
social justice.
Even though Nussbaum seems to be aware of the
problem of the specific “aura” of the lavish imagina-
tion of moral goodness that potentially threatens to en-
capsulate the subject of compassion, shield it from the
harsh and “messy” reality of engaging with plural opin-
ions, and potentially lead to inactivity, we cannot find
any extensive problematisation of this pitfall in her ac-
count. Hence, it is helpful to turn to Arendt’s delibera-
tions again: According to Arendt, the good feeling of pity
might indeed lure us into an “emotion-laden insensitiv-
ity to reality” (Arendt, 1963/2016, p. 85). In that we lav-
ishly revel in compassionate emotions, in ourmere phan-
tasies of helping others, of acting for them (potentially
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as subordinate others), Arendt shows us that we are in
danger of losing touch with reality. This not only leads to
self-deception (see Arendt’s criticism on the emotional
state of the romanticists such as the Jewish salonnière
Rahel Varnhagen; Arendt, 1957/1997) but also serves as
a predisposition for totalitarian rule—which, for Arendt,
showed its precursors in the French Revolution. Arendt
writes, the French revolutionaries, in the “boundlessness
of their sentiments…, felt no compunctions in sacrificing”
real people for “their ‘principles’” (Arendt, 1963/2016,
p. 85). The reality of violence and suffering, according
to Arendt, did not move the French revolutionaries, who
were spellbound by the magic of the collective emotion
they had actively evoked.
While Nussbaum’s theory was of course designed to
promote the opposite of violence and terror, and while
her project succeeds for themost part in promoting com-
munal, peaceful, and even “loving” cooperation, the un-
derlying challenge of an “insensitivity to reality” due to
the elated feeling of moral goodness and compassion is
still a conceptual and also quite real threat that cannot
easily be refuted when one studies Nussbaum’s theory
of emotions.
4. The Pitfalls of “Love and Kindness”
In order to illustrate my theoretical reflections on the
two substantial pitfalls of the strategic employment of
compassion in the political realm, I would now like to
turn to Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign video clips
called “Love and Kindness”.
The first of the two one-minute video clips features al-
most ten close-ups of Clinton’s encounters with African
Americans. In one scene in the first video clip, Clinton
holds a black child tightly and is depicted saying, presum-
ably to his relatives, “We will need to make sure he gets
a chance to…learn how to do that”. Also, females are
distinctly featured in both video clips. The very first cap-
tion of the second video clip reads “For our daughters”,
while the caption “For our sons” follows after being sep-
arated by a scene without a caption. It is thus obvious
that the original aim of the campaign ads was (a) to ad-
dress African American and female voters, and to state
that (b) these two major groups of the US-American soci-
etywere to be supported in their struggle for equal oppor-
tunities and social justice—through an explicit demand
for compassion. This demand is verbalised in a scene in
which Clinton says: “We have too much inequality every-
where that limits the potential for a lot of people”, and
by the captions that accompany various scenes of Clin-
ton on the campaign trail: “Let’s break down barriers/So
we can all rise together/Do all the good we can/In all the
ways we can/For all the people we can/Let’s protect each
other/Let’s support eachother/Let’s stand together”, they
read in the first video ad, and, in the modified ver-
sion of the second: “For our daughters/For our sons/For
our country/Let’s support each other/Be kind to each
other/Lift each other up/together/Stronger together”.
It is in this explicit appeal to compassion as a po-
litical means and end that the pitfall of a dual-level hi-
erarchisation is clearly recognisable. First, the scene of
Clinton hugging the child displays a hierarchy between
the (white) politician and the citizenry (of colour): from
Clinton’s statement “We will need to make sure he gets
a chance to…learn how to do that” it is not clear whom
Clinton designates as the “we”. This scene, then, alludes
to the promotion of a politics for, instead of a politics
designed to undertake with, either/both the boy as a
signifier for Americans of colour or/and a subordinate
citizenry itself. Interestingly, the image remained in the
second video ad, but not Clinton’s accompanying state-
ment. Secondly, on the metalevel of a politics of compas-
sion, the campaign videos clearly visualise a political pro-
gramme of urging citizens to be (more) compassionate.
The explicit appeal to compassion as a public principle to
be striven for is combined with an obvious partisanship
for African Americans and women.
In her sociological study of Tea Party members in
Louisiana, Strangers in Their Own Land (2016), Arlie
Russell Hochschild records that, during the Obama ad-
ministration, many Trump supporters and Tea Party
members she spoke to had expressed resentment of the
fact that they felt they were forced to sympathise with
alleged “beneficiaries” of the welfare system, most no-
tably with people of colour, when, really, they neither
felt norwanted to feel this forced compassion for people
they perceived as “cutting the line” (Hochschild, 2016,
p. 137). Reading Hochschild’s emphatic study it becomes
very clear that these (mostly white) Southern Tea Party
members who, to a certain extent, seem to be represen-
tative of a larger group of Republican voters, regarded
themselves as competing with people of colour, and, in-
creasingly, with women, for the perceived sparse fruits
of their hard labour. They found themselves in what
they saw as a distribution battle that threatened their
existence—both in terms of their wealth and their values.
Politicians, especially non-Republicans, were perceived
as promoting (their) exclusion for the sake of inclusion
(of “the other”).
From Hochschild’s study, it thus becomes clear that
inclusion and the enforcement of social justice were re-
garded as the one single pressing political issue that her
interviewees rejected (often along underlying racial and
gendered divisions). Hence, the call for more compas-
sion towards others such as the one depicted in Clinton’s
“Love and Kindness” ads would have certainly been per-
ceived both as a totalising notion of inflicting “politically
correct rules of feeling” (Hochschild, 2016, p. 228) onto
them that they absolutely rejected and, ultimately, as an
obstacle to their own flourishing.
During his run for the presidency, Donald Trump
created an emotional cloud that was explicitly directed
against these perceived “feeling rules” and political cor-
rectness. The “high” of enthusiasm (Hochschild, 2016,
p. 228) that Trump’s candidacy created has so far led
to a substantial neglect of (legal) reality and facts to an
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unknown degree. However, shifting the analysis from
Trump to Clinton means that we acknowledge that
Clinton and her campaign team, too, sought to create
a specific emotional atmosphere for her campaign, and
beyond. Thus, the second potential pitfall of a politics
of compassion that I have identified above, the “magic”
of feeling compassion/pity that might lead to deception
and an insensitivity to reality, can also be illustrated quite
fittingly by the two campaign videos: accompanied by
lots of musical pathos—the soul singer Andra Day’s lyrics
“Spread a little hope and love now/We will walk it out
together now”—, particularly in the 60 seconds of the
older campaign ad Clinton is continuously depicted smil-
ing, hugging, embracing, exchanging high-fives, listening
to citizens and their stories, appearing to be moved by
others and their stories, offering verbal and non-verbal
support. On reflection, the lavishly exhibited display of
an appeal to compassion, kindness, solidarity, and public
“love” might have led pre-inclined viewers to revel in the
powerful pathos and utopia of a compassionate society.
This specific mood might have intensified in contrast to
Donald Trump’s addressing of anger, fear, and aggression.
The contrast between the Democrat’s display of an
emotional revelling in altruistic feelings and the emo-
tional state of the specific group of US-American voters
that Hochschild portrays could not have been much big-
ger. If we again turn to Hochschild’s study, we are pre-
sented with portraits of citizens who, instead of being
willing to extend their compassion towards others and
offer their share to act accordingly, felt that their own
lot had been governed by the harsh reality of a life some-
how gone downhill. Hochschild’s interviewees perceived
a cultural shift experienced as foreign and false that
made them feel instead as “strangers in their own land”
(Hochschild, 2016). It is against this backdrop that Trump,
instead of a (female connoted) “public culture of com-
passion”, proposed a (masculine) vision of a “greater”
America and a better future for those who felt “left be-
hind”. As Amy Skonieczny (2018) also argues in this issue,
Trump’s explicit and calculated appeal to thosemourning
a “bygone America” (p. 71) was accompanied by a simul-
taneous proposition to blame and exclude “the other”
(p. 63), which fell on fruitful ground.
Paradoxically, Hochschild’s study shows that many of
the people she portrayed regarded themselves as very
compassionate, often acting as such, yet only towards
those perceived as near and dear, and as “entitled” to
support. The interviewees did not want an intrusive gov-
ernment urging them towards a more compassionate
life, which they believed they were already living. In-
stead, they wanted light-touch governance to secure the
promise of the American Dream by (re-)turning to polit-
ical deregulation. In seeking to have this promise come
true, they had to endure man-made catastrophes, pollu-
tion, and the deterioration of their health. “They were vic-
timswithout a language of victimhood”, Hochschild (2016,
p. 131) emphasises. Interestingly, her interviewees seem
to have been torn between the desire to demand compas-
sion directed towards themselves and a disdain for exactly
this kind of appeal (Hochschild, 2016, pp. 144–145).
It is this reality, the complexity of and the rift be-
tween the collective emotional states of US-American
voters that Clinton’s campaign ads do not seem to have
been able to represent or address adequately. The over-
riding tone of the two campaign ads conveys an opulence
in the promotionof compassion, amoral ‘high-ground’ of
altruism for certain groups of the population, but not all,
which apparently was not able to serve as a soundboard
given the nation’s great societal divide.
5. Conclusion
Both a look at Hannah Arendt’s warnings against employ-
ing pity as a political emotion and at a fitting illustration
of the attempt to utilise compassion as a political means
and a political end in current politics—Hillary Clinton’s
election campaign videos—have provided us with rele-
vant challenges to Nussbaum’s ideal of a “public culture
of compassion”. Indeed, the very aspect Nussbaum so ve-
hemently wants to overcome with her project—societal
divisions due to hierarchies—nevertheless seems to crop
up as part of the attempt to implement her normative vi-
sion. Furthermore, such a theoretical project might even
threaten to border on a sort of Arendtian totalising no-
tion of a “popular will” of a political collective, with com-
passion serving both as political means and end. This is a
valid challenge to a democratic idea of a “public culture
of compassion”, one that might not easily be discarded
by Nussbaum’s rather unelaborated remarks on the no-
tion that possibilities of dissent to such undertaking nec-
essarily have to be provided for.
A rigorous “public culture of compassion” might in-
deed become at risk of suppressing plurality and plural
(political) opinions at a certain point, by establishing hi-
erarchical obstacles both in the relationship between the
subject and the object of compassion/pity itself, and in
the subject and the object of a political agenda of com-
passionate emotions. Hence, we should keep in mind
that the utilisation of emotions in politics inevitably con-
tributes to certain practices of power (e.g., Illouz, 2007)
which are also, to a certain extent, prone to exclusion
and even violence. Furthermore, Arendt cautions that
pity serving as the heart of a political agenda demands
that, logically, an object of pity must always be given:
“Without the presence of misfortune, pity could not ex-
ist” (Arendt, 1963/2016, p. 84). Theoretically, misfortune
might thus be perpetuated, or even aggravated, in order
to ensure that the political agenda of striving towards a
collective emotion of compassion/pity continues to have
a legitimate object.
Additionally, the specific “aura” that the attempt to
invoke compassion/pity as political means and/or end
can create may run counter to the subjective experience
and the (more objective) givenness of reality. This is pre-
cisely that which Arendt has stressed throughout her un-
systematic “theory of emotions”—that emotions in gen-
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eral, and especially pity, create a “magic” feeling of be-
ing thus immersed in the respective emotion that reality
becomes blurred. A “public culture of compassion” can
thus impede its own aim of inclusion by furthering soci-
etal and political divides vertically and horizontally, pro-
viding obstacles to representation and thus, eventually,
threaten the very essence of democratic practices.
All this is not to say, however, that Arendt’s over-
all rejection of allowing pity to come into play in poli-
tics should not be equally criticised (e.g., von Tevenar,
2014; Whitebrook, 2014)—despite their difficulties and
ambivalences (see also Pedwell, 2014) compassionate
emotions perform vital functions in societies and politics.
Thus, Nussbaum has not only rightly argued that a poli-
tics of compassion should be furthered to grantmore jus-
tice and equality, but also, among others, Joan C. Tronto
(1993/2009) and Elisabeth Porter (2006), who have es-
tablished links between a politics of compassion with a
very necessary politics of care.
Additionally, my aim was not to claim that Nuss-
baum’s overall vision of a “public culture of compassion”
should be refuted. On the contrary—we can draw from
Nussbaum’s theory the idea that there is a certain ap-
peal, a beauty even, to the “emotion-driven politics” of
compassion/pity if employed with decent motives and
monitoring. With Nussbaum’s account, we are convinc-
ingly tempted to counter exclusionary tendencies with
compassion and a more utopian vision of the “good
life” that can be created for one another in a commu-
nal space, both in theory and in practice. And, indeed,
if one consults Strangers in their Own Land, one is in-
clined to agree with Arlie Hochschild that what is needed
is the demolition of “empathy walls” (e.g., Hochschild,
2016, p. 5) and greater effort to understand “the other”.
Hochschild reports that many of those who supported
the Tea Party movement, and very likely Trump as presi-
dent, were compassionate neighbours and churchgoers.
What is needed here, it seems, is in fact not the abolish-
ment of compassion in our public life but the enlarge-
ment of our respective circles of concern (Nussbaum,
2013, p. 11)—as well as a resolute fight against prevail-
ing societal sexism and racism.
Nussbaum’s rather fascinating normative approach
can hence provide us with very engaging ideas for a spe-
cific political agenda that is, in many ways, very different
from the one that we see prevalent in Donald Trump’s
presidency, or in the many excesses of right-wing pop-
ulism that have cropped up in many parts in Europe.
Arendt’s theoretical warnings and Clinton’s practical ex-
ample, however, have made it clear that there are some
major challenges that must be addressed in further the-
oretical reflections on a “public culture of compassion”,
especially in such politically charged times of upheaval.
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